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Frank Umbach
Today’s $50-a-barrel oil is thefallout from soaring world en-ergy demand and diminishing
supply. Crisis looms—but is being
resolutely ignored by European policy
makers.
Current strategic trends in global
energy are two-fold. One is the bur-
geoning demand in Asia (mainly
China and India). The other is the
world’s dwindling surplus production
capacity that could be mobilized fast
to meet a rapid rise in global demand
for crude oil and natural gas or to
compensate for a loss of scheduled
production capacity. Last May the In-
ternational Energy Agency (IEA)
again had to raise its initial forecast of
world-wide demand for crude oil
from 78.7 million barrels a day
(mb/d) to 82.5 mb/d—an increase
nearly twice the average growth regis-
tered over the past five years. The IEA
estimates that China’s oil consump-
tion alone will swell in 2004 by 13 per-
cent, from 5.49 mb/d in 2003 to 6.2
mb/d. Whereas the link between eco-
nomic growth and escalation in ener-
gy demand (which has decelerated)
has been weakening in OECD coun-
tries for years, energy needs in China
continue to exceed economic growth.
There is reason to fear short-term
global production bottlenecks that
could lead to even higher crude oil
prices and seriously slow economic
growth rates around the world. Such
anxiety is especially justified if terror-
ist attacks spread not only in Iraq but
also in Saudi Arabia—the largest oil
producer—and increasingly affect the
oil infrastructure (such as production
capacity and refineries). The issue of
ensuring international energy supply
in the short- and medium-term there-
fore lies less in the finiteness of crude
oil and natural gas reserves (41 and 60
years, respectively) than in the accu-
mulation of regional crises and do-
mestic political instability of the
countries producing crude oil and
natural gas; in surplus production ca-
pacity that has been steadily dimin-
ishing since the 1990s because of glob-
al competitive pressure; in an unex-
pected surge in global oil demand;
and in a huge need for investment in
new exploration, refineries, pipelines,
and other infrastructure elements.
The challenges in protecting the
global energy supply are not lost on
the European Union. They were
pointed out, along with numerous
structural weaknesses of the EU, in
November 2000 in the EU Commis-
sion’s Green Paper on a European
strategy for the security of energy sup-
ply. The Commission expressed con-
cern about the prediction that depen-
dence on energy imports will reach 70
percent by 2030. It foresaw that the
portion of EU energy consumption
covered by imports could climb from
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76 to 90 percent for oil, from 40 to 70
percent for natural gas,and from 50 to
more than 70 percent for coal.
Under these circumstances the no-
tion that the market regulates every-
thing will have to be critically exam-
ined and widened to include the glob-
al and geopolitical dimensions of the
international energy supply in com-
ing decades.
Global Dimensions
According to the IEA and many
other energy organizations, fossil
fuels will remain the most important
primary source of energy until 2030,
covering more than 90 percent of the
global increase in energy demand de-
spite world-wide development of al-
ternative energy sources. Natural gas
will be the fastest growing fossil fuel
source of energy (2.4 percent annual-
ly). However, crude oil—accounting
for 37 percent of the world’s energy
mix—will remain the world’s most
important global energy source,
thanks to the expansion of the trans-
port sector (whose share of total oil
consumption will rise from 47 to
about 55 percent). Renewable energy
sources and new technologies (such as
the fuel cell) will reportedly be unable
to contribute much to the global en-
ergy supply until after 2025 or 2030.
True, the increase in global known
reserves of oil and natural gas has ac-
celerated again since 2000, making a
global energy crisis unlikely in the
short or medium term. But oil prices
are likely to outpace that growth, be-
cause the global equilibrium between
oil demand,oil production,and oil re-
serves will shift, and because the costs
of oil exploration in deep seas as well
as in remote and relatively inaccessi-
ble regions like the Arctic will soar.
The Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC), the IEA,
and the American Energy Informa-
tion Administration all anticipate that
total demand for crude oil will reach
103 to 118 mb/d by 2020.OPEC coun-
tries alone will produce approximate-
ly 55 to 65 mb/d of that total, pushing
OPEC’s share of global oil production
from its current level of 32-38 percent
to more than 50 percent.
More than 60 percent of the future
rise in world demand for primary en-
ergy will come from rapid economic
and population growth in developing
countries. Industrialization, urban-
ization, and the replacement of non-
commercial biomass by commercial
fuels also explain why demand for pri-
mary energy will be greater in that
part of the world than in OECD coun-
tries. From 2000 to 2030 the share of
global energy demand accounted for
by OECD countries will decline from
58 to 47 percent, while that of devel-
oping countries is likely to climb from
30 to 43 percent. Emerging countries
will also be responsible for 29 mb/d of
the forecast world-wide increase in oil
consumption of up to 45 mb/d.
With Asia already consuming one
quarter of the oil needed in the world,
energy consumption will approxi-
mately double in the next twenty
years. In 2020, the continent will have
to import up to 80 percent (currently
60 percent) of the oil it needs (com-
pared to 27 percent for the United
States).Largely without policies to en-
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sure its energy supply and and with-
out adequate diversification of its en-
ergy sources and imports,Asia already
has to pay an "Asian premium” of up
to $1.50 per barrel more than the
world market price.
China is mired in a worsening ener-
gy crisis, finding itself compelled this
summer to pare back electricity con-
sumption by 30 million kilowatts in
nearly two-thirds of the country be-
cause of the overheated climate and
economy. Almost 6,400 companies
had to close for one week by govern-
ment order until mid-August to pre-
vent the electricity network from col-
lapsing completely. In the first six
months of 2004 more than 750,000
temporary power cuts were ordered
by the government nation-wide. De-
spite efforts by China to introduce re-
newable energies (especially wind
power), the country’s tremendous en-
ergy demand means that its share of
electric power production will rise to
just 10 percent by 2010 and only 12
percent by 2020.
Moreover, energy demand will
double by 2020 not only in China and
India, but also in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations.Despite new
efforts to diversify in these states, oil
will remain their most important
source of energy, although the re-
gion’s own production will ebb.
Southeast Asia’s oil reserves are al-
ready lower than Europe’s. In 2004 the
largest oil producer in the area, In-
donesia,will become a net importer of
oil for the first time. Its oil fields are
exhausted, and foreign investment is
inadequate because of violent domes-
tic instabilities.
Middle East Crisis Region
As imports of oil and natural gas in-
crease throughout the world, the glob-
al political importance of the crisis-
ridden Middle East will only increase
proportionally.This change will be felt
especially if OPEC should some day
succeed in forging a political consen-
sus that goes beyond energy policy
tand comes active in the unresolved Is-
raeli-Palestinian dispute. Further-
more, there is a crucial difference be-
tween the situation today and that of
the 1973/74 oil price shock. The oil
sheiks at that time were able to hike
prices only for a short time, because
there were many oil-producing com-
petitors and because the Western oil
companies were able to develop new
fields in Alaska, Canada, and the
North Sea.
But if the countries of the Near East
came to think  in the future that the
Western oil companies had no alter-
native sources of petroleum,the polit-
ical balance between oil-producing
and oil-importing countries would
shift toward OPEC. Ninety percent of
the world’s known oil reserves lie in
the Islamic world, ranging from the
fields in Central Asia and the Caspian
Basin,most of which have yet to be ex-
ploited, to the Persian Gulf. The six
member states of the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council (Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates) have more
than 45 percent of the world’s known
oil reserves and 15 percent of the
world’s gas resources. If Iraq and Iran
are included, the Persian Gulf as a
whole has approximately 65 percent of
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the world’s oil reserves and 34 percent
of the world’s natural gas reserves.
For these reasons, the Gulf region
will have a pivotal role in the global
supply of both oil and natural gas. Yet
the domestic political conditions in
ten of the fourteen oil-exporting
countries are unstable, and conflicts
could bring about disruptions of ex-
ports to the world market. At present
half of world energy demand is met by
oil-producing states whose domestic
instability poses a high risk.The likeli-
hood of medium-term energy im-
passes, attendant drastic price in-
creases, and major supply crises be-
tween now and 2020 is thus growing.
Uncertainty will be compounded par-
ticularly if Saudi Arabia—both the
largest oil producer and the one with
the largest known oil reserves and the
only notable surplus production ca-
pacity—should fail to deliver.
Demand in Emerging Countries
As world demand for oil shifts from
the Western industrialized states to
the most populous industrialized
emerging countries such as China and
India in the 21st century, the global
share of refineries will also move from
the US and Europe to Asia and other
regions. Not only will the increase in
global demand for oil have to be met
by politically unstable regions; 60 per-
cent of the world’s refinery system will
be located there. Relatively frequent
production stoppages could at the
least cause major fluctuations in
world prices for oil, gasoline, and nat-
ural gas. Competition over resources
is already heating up in Asia, especial-
ly between China and Japan, the
world’s second- and third-largest oil
consumers; the two are vying for a
pipeline from Russia (to China or Na-
chodka on Russia’s Pacific coast) and
the exploitation of offshore oil in the
East China Sea.
In times of crisis and conflict, addi-
tional capacity to pump oil and deliv-
er natural gas is more limited than
ever. In the second Gulf war
(1990–1991) only Saudi Arabia was
able to increase its oil production sig-
nificantly (by 2 mb/d). It offset the
loss of 4 to 5 mb/d from Iraq and
Kuwait (whose combined output con-
stituted approximately 14.7 percent of
the world’s oil exports at that time)
and kept prices stable after a brief rise.
By early 1998 these uncommitted de-
livery capacities of OPEC members
had shrunk from 5 mb/d in the early
1990s (22 percent of OPEC’s entire
production, or 10 percent of world oil
production) to only 1.5 mb/d (only 9
percent of OPEC’s production, or 3
percent of world production). In April
2003, the theoretically available spare
oil production capacity of 7.3 mb/d
had dropped to somewhere between
0.7 and 1.2 mb/d.
In June 2004 OPEC actually
pumped not only the agreed quota of
23.5 mb/d, but 27 to 28 mb/d. To re-
duce the international price of oil,
Saudi Arabia raised its oil production
by 2 mb/d,delivering up to 10.3 mb/d.
The United Arab Emirates were like-
wise able to boost their production
(by 400,000 mb/d), but Venezuela, In-
donesia, Nigeria, and other leading
oil-producers either no longer had any
appreciable reserve capacities or had
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their own domestic political crises and
production stoppages to deal with. At
such levels, even Saudi Arabia’s ability
to raise production has limits.
Russia’s Problems
As for Russia, its problems lie less
with increased production than with
pipeline bottlenecks in any attempt to
deliver additional oil to the world
market. Iraq could theoretically pump
up to 6 mb/d, but because of its tense
security situation will hardly figure as
a leading oil exporter on the world
market for the next few years. Current
delivery has not even regained the
prewar level of 2.5 mb/d. Such a vast
production increase is unrealistic
without massive investment of at least
$25 billion, and investment on that
scale will not materialize for Iraq
under present conditions. The coun-
try is therefore likely to remain side-
lined as a major oil producer for the
foreseeable future.
Lastly, in Norway a strike tem-
porarily halted production in the oil
industry, which normally provides
more than 3mb/d,or almost 4 percent
of the world’s demand for oil.Norway
exports nearly all of this oil, making
the country the world’s third-largest
oil exporter, so the stoppage deprived
an already tight international oil mar-
ket of a further 375,000 barrels.
In previous decades the world’s
surplus production capacity, includ-
ing OPEC’s, was never this low. The
ten OPEC members alone have lost
more than 1 mb/d over the last two
years by raising their oil production to
compensate for production stoppages
in Venezuela, Indonesia,Nigeria, Iraq,
and other countries. International ex-
perts contend that Saudi Arabia could
increase its production to only 11.2
mb/d should further stoppages occur
throughout the world. An additional
200,000 barrels per day could come
from other members of OPEC and
less than 1 mb/d from nonmembers.
By late 2004, when seasonal global oil
demand increases by 3 to 4 mb/d, this
capacity might no longer suffice to
satisfy the world’s oil needs at a mid-
dle-range price level. The situation on
the market could also be exacerbated
by Beijing’s laudable plan to allocate
$10 billion to build up China’s own
strategic oil reserve in order to help
protect the long-term energy supply
of the People’s Republic.
Major foreign investment,especial-
ly on the part of private utility corpo-
rations, will come in only when there
are stable political conditions for it.
Without it, however, many oil- and
gas-exporting states risk losing their
economic foundations. The result
could be an escalation of domestic
unrest and instability that scares off
even more investors, spawning a vi-
cious circle like the current one in
Iraq, Central Asia (the Caspian
Basin), and African countries. To
meet the nearly 50 percent rise in
global energy demand expected by
2020, oil production in the Persian
Gulf must increase by 80 percent.This
feat will be possible only if sufficient
foreign investment flows in, if all sanc-
tions and embargoes are lifted from
Iraq and Iran, and if the entire region
is politically stable. The last-named
condition seems rather unlikely, as
56 T R A N S AT L A N T I C  I N T E R N AT I O N A L E  P O L I T I K 4/2004
A N A L Y S E S
impressively documented by the two
Arab Human Development Reports
of 2002 and 2003, which exposed the
backwardness and persistent dearth
of economic and political will for re-
form in most Arab states with rapidly
growing populations.
Development Costs
It is estimated that approximately
$300 billion is required for the devel-
opment of new oil and natural gas
fields in the six member states of the
Gulf Cooperation Council, and the
IEA has estimated that world-wide in-
vestment in the energy sector will
come to $16 trillion by 2030. At the
most recent meeting of the Asia-Pacif-
ic Economic Cooperation even con-
servative estimates of the investment
required to achieve average economic
growth of only 3.5 percent in the re-
gion by 2020 went as high as $4.4 tril-
lion for Asia’s oil infrastructure
alone—despite the decision by the
ASEAN nations t to follow China’s ex-
ample and recover about 10 percent
all the energy they consume.
These global strategic trends in the
reliability of the international energy
supply and the increasing importance
of geopolitical factors highlight the
extreme dependence of the global en-
ergy supply on a highly unstable re-
gion—the Middle East—and hence
on political circumstances. The faith
in market mechanisms as a cure-all
appears to be as boundless as ever, es-
pecially in Germany. In the last 15
years the dependability of the energy
supply has been left to the private util-
ity companies, whose corporate strat-
egy is primarily profit-driven. Scarce-
ly anyone has felt ultimately responsi-
ble for safeguarding the future supply
of energy.Although the October 2001
energy report by Germany’s Ministry
of Economics put as much impor-
tance on reliable energy supply as on
the political objectives of environ-
mental compatibility and efficiency,
the vulnerability of the international
energy supply received little attention.
And what scant treatment the subject
did get was not the kind the EU Com-
mission desired. Despite the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 in the
United States, whose aftermath has
once again focused world interest on
the future political stability of the
Middle East, the geopolitical factors
affecting the international security of
the energy supply tend to be less a
concern in Germany than in the rest
of the world. Although Foreign Min-
ister Joschka Fischer has justifiably
and repeatedly pointed out energy’s
centrality to world politics, the foreign
ministry evidently still sees no need to
involve itself long-term in the future
energy policy of Germany and the EU
by offering expertise in regional, for-
eign, and security policy. The tacit as-
sumption still seems to be that elec-
tricity comes from the wall socket and
gasoline from the gasoline pump.
Paired with an ideological and dog-
matic rather than a pragmatic bent,
Germany’s provincialism and the lack
of concern about global factors and
developments are quickly hitting Eu-
ropean limits. Although pursuit of a
national energy policy is economical-
ly and politically ever more anachro-
nistic, Berlin is not really seeking to
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transfer elements of its authority and
sovereignty to Brussels so that a com-
mon European energy policy could
emerge. The German government
knows that its views on energy policy,
including the unilateral withdrawal
from the use of nuclear power, cannot
carry a majority within the EU. Even
the internationally salient question of
climate policy does not convince
Berlin to regard nuclear power as an
important option, although the EU
Commission, the IEA, the World En-
ergy Council, and numerous interna-
tional energy experts are urging pre-
cisely that.
While Europe’s safest nuclear
power plants are therefore being shut
down, Finland, France, Russia, Italy,
and many new Central European
members of the EU have indicated
that they do not want to renounce the
nuclear power option.In fact, the con-
struction of new nuclear power plants
is being declared or seriously consid-
ered. Even Sweden no longer pre-
cludes the possibility of rethinking its
decision to close down its nuclear
power plants. For economic, techno-
logical, and political reasons, the nu-
clear power option is also undergoing
a renaissance in the United States and
particularly in Asia. In a new report
the International Atomic Energy Or-
ganization has forecast that the use of
nuclear energy throughout the world
could increase by 70 percent by 2030,
raising the share of world energy de-
mand met by nuclear power from
today’s 16 percent to 27 percent—and
could rise even higher by 2050.
The reasons lie in international en-
vironmental policy (the Kyoto Proto-
col),economic policy,and supply pol-
icy. Currently, 442 power plants in 30
countries are meeting one-sixth of the
world’s demand for electricity. Ambi-
tious programs to build new nuclear
power plants exist in Asia,particularly
in China and India, although nuclear
power will cover only 4 to 6 percent of
the huge energy demand in China by
2020. Of the 27 nuclear power plants
now under construction, 18 are locat-
ed in Asia. Characteristically, the de-
bate over coal as an energy source in
Germany is also framed solely in
terms of subsidies and environmental
issues,although it is the country’s only
sizeable fossil-fuel resource. Even
though subsidization of renewable
energies is, on average, at least twice
the level per energy unit as that for
coal, they too should be analyzed with
an eye to ensuring Germany’s energy
supply.
The need for such thinking is
sharpening, especially because world
demand for coal has intensified, so
much so that German coal importers
now speak of a "coal OPEC.” China,
although it has the world’s largest coal
deposits, is importing more and more
additional coal (up to now,usually for
environmental reasons, since foreign
coal generally contains less sulfur than
China’s own stocks).
Fixation on Russia?
Given the political instabilities in
the Middle East, the natural solution
for Germany and the rest of the EU
seems to be to expand imports of oil
and natural gas from Russia, as ex-
pressed in the European-Russian en-
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ergy partnership proclaimed in 2000.
At first glance, there are indeed a
number of reasons (not least the argu-
ment of improved political stability)
for a drastic escalation of energy im-
ports from Russia. In the first four
months of 2004, 47.6 percent of the
natural gas that Germany consumed
came from Russia, and the corre-
sponding figure for oil was 33.8 per-
cent.The imports of natural gas could
rise to 60 percent or more by 2030.
However, the expense of the infra-
structure and the investment involved
make the supply of natural gas far less
flexible than that of oil, especially dur-
ing crises. (Many states depend on a
single pipeline.)  A technical compli-
cation with the pipeline or a political-
ly motivated interruption of the
pipeline flow is much more serious
than with the supply of oil, because
the resulting shortfalls cannot be off-
set quickly by other deliveries. This
predicament will exist until Germany
and the rest of Europe shift largely to
imports of liquefied natural gas,
which are, however more expensive.
Diversification
Excessive dependence on Russia,
especially for natural gas imports,
would run counter to the EU’s imper-
ative of diversification. It would also
prove to be a delicate problem because
of linkage between foreign and securi-
ty policy motives in Russia’s approach
to energy exports, which by no means
follows purely economic criteria. The
current Yukos affair shows that jailed
Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s
political ambitions were certainly not
the only thorn in the side of Russian
President Vladimir Putin. Another
one was Yukos’s plan to build the first
private pipeline from Russia to China
and to sell a 25 percent share of Yukos
to the American utility giant Exxon,
an idea that encountered stiff resis-
tance not only from Russia’s still large-
ly state-owned utility industry but
also from the Kremlin. The Kremlin
has no intention of losing control over
Russian resources, the utility corpora-
tions, or, most of all, pipeline policy.
In this sense, real market structures
have yet to appear in the Russian utili-
ty industry. It continues as a kind of
state capitalism whose most striking
feature is the effort to preserve the
Kremlin’s political control. From the
outset of Putin’s presidency, this char-
acteristic has prompted many experts
to speak of a “creeping renationaliza-
tion” of Russia’s utility industry, al-
though Putin has pragmatically wel-
comed an increase in the financial in-
volvement of Western companies, es-
pecially German ones. Moreover,
Moscow has so far ratified neither the
international Energy Charter nor the
protocol concerning transit and will
not abide by the World Trade Organi-
zation’s rules on competition in the
energy sector. Under these circum-
stances, it would be politically and
economically shortsighted for Ger-
many and the rest of Europe to con-
centrate their energy policies fully and
unilaterally on Russia.
Such fixation would be even more
precarious for the former Warsaw
Pact countries,which are still far more
dependent on Russian energy than
Western Europe is. They seek to in-
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crease their energy imports from
other countries and regions, even if it
is more expensive than the Russian
option. Importing oil and natural gas
from Central Asia would often be fi-
nancially more attractive for Europe.
It would also be in keeping with the
principle of diversification and would
contribute to the economic and polit-
ical stabilization of this large area,
whose geopolitical importance to Eu-
rope and other regions is growing. In-
tensification of, and political backing
for, energy management at the EU
level has become particularly neces-
sary for Europe since the eastward ex-
pansion of NATO and the EU, for Eu-
rope cannot isolate itself from the in-
stability emanating from Central Asia.
In view of Russia’s need for vast in-
ward foreign investment of up to $600
billion, it is highly doubtful whether
that country in the next two decades
can modernize its own utility indus-
try enough to keep pace with the ener-
gy exports that Moscow is planning to
make to Europe. From the EU’s per-
spective,expansion of energy imports
from Russia should therefore coincide
with expansion of such imports from
Central Asia, the Caspian Basin, and
(on a lesser scale) Africa. This linkage
should be an integral part of a Euro-
pean strategy to secure the long-term
supply of energy if the already heavy
dependence on Russia, the Middle
East, and OPEC is not to become even
greater.
In the last decade the global de-
mand for oil has shot to twice the level
it was at in the preceding 20 years.
Moreover, indications are mounting
that the pace at which exhausted oil
fields are being replaced by new ones
is slowing, despite swelling world-
wide reserves of oil. Many forecasts of
current oil reserves could prove to be
overly optimistic. The high concen-
tration of oil and natural gas reserves
in the "strategic arc of the Greater
Middle East;” the unexpectedly rapid
rise of global energy demand (partic-
ularly in Asia); and the growing
dependence of the EU, Asia, and the
United States on imports of oil and
natural gas from relatively unstable
countries increase the likelihood of
supply disruptions and bottlenecks
from terrorist attacks, political
unrest, strikes, or environmental 
disasters.
Granted, the EU has an ambitious
program with which it aims to meet
20 percent of its demand for electrici-
ty and 12 percent its total energy de-
mand with renewable resources by
2010. Even if it succeeds, however,
rampant global energy needs, surging
EU imports of oil and natural gas
from politically unstable regions, and
other geopolitical factors will mean-
while require the use of every available
energy source to solve the global chal-
lenges of energy management and se-
cure Europe’s energy supply. Neither
Germany nor the EU is close to being
ready to face this new new challenge.
The Europeans have neither built up
sufficient strategic stocks to weather
future crises, nor do they manage the
stocks they have in a way that could
ensure their energy security.
They urgently need to do so before
it’s too late.
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